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Chapter 2  ON GOING “BEYOND THE PALE OF THE HUMAN”? 
Ken Surin 
 
Introductory 
It is no surprise that most theories of liberation are replete with references to subjects, 
subjectivities, identities, actors, agents, and their cognates. It would seem, furthermore, that no 
version of marxism or socialism can get by without an anthropology, or some account of the 
human, that furnishes a sense of the place of humankind in the several orders (including nature) 
in which the beings designated as ‘human’ are able to function. I assume that this theory of 
liberation must hinge on an ontology whose premises are at once materialist (i.e. having as its 
primary, though not necessarily sole, focus the myriad forms and outcomes of human activity, 
with an emphasis on social struggles) and immanentist (i.e. eschewing any appeal to forces and 
entities which rely fundamentally on supranatural principles for their being and activity). The 
problem here with any anthropology or vision of the human is that it will probably rest on 
assumptions that have been powerfully challenged in recent decades by a widely accepted 
thinking which purports to move thought beyond the so-called ‘age of Man’. It will be necessary 
therefore for a theory of liberation to engage with this strand of post-anthropological thought. 
I shall also assume that a politics of liberation for today has to be premised on an 
acceptance of the death of a previous kind of politics, that is, the politics of representation that 
began roughly with the American and the French Revolutions of the eighteenth century. 
Concomitantly with the general withering away of this representational politics, a process that 
began with the political upheavals of the late 1960s, has been the demise of the subject of this 
representational politics. 
Michel Foucault was perhaps the first philosopher to make explicit the connection 
between liberation as a theoretical model and liberation as a set of practices (it should be 
stressed that Foucault made this distinction between the model and these practices so that their 
inherent connectedness could be maintained all the more rigorously); and even more 
importantly, he insisted that any elaboration of the practices involved here has to be 
safeguarded from a tacitly or explicitly accepted conception of human nature that guides the 
investigation without itself being scrutinized. Foucault is worth quoting at length on this: 
 
I’ve always been a little distrustful of the general theme of liberation, to the extent that, 
if one does not treat it with a certain number of safeguards and within certain limits, 
there is a danger that it will refer back to the idea that there does exist a nature or a 
human foundation which, as a result of a certain number of historical, social or 
economic processes, found itself concealed, alienated or imprisoned in and by some 
repressive mechanism…. I don’t think that this is a theme which can be admitted 
without rigorous examination. I do not mean to say that liberation or such and such a 
form of liberation does not exist. When a colonial people tries to free itself of its 
colonizer, that is truly an act of liberation, in the strict sense of the word. But as we 
also know, that in this extremely precise example, this act of liberation is not 
sufficient to establish the practices of liberty that later on will be necessary for this 
people, this society and these individuals to decide upon receivable or acceptable 
forms of their existence or political society. That is why I insist on the practices of 
freedom rather than on the processes which indeed have their place, but which by 
themselves, do not seem to me to be able to decide all the practical forms of liberty.1 
                                                             
1 See Foucault, ‘The Ethic of Care for the Self as a Practice of Freedom: an Interview with Michel Foucault 
on January 20, 1984’, conducted by Raúl Fornet-Betancourt, Helmut Becker, and Alfredo Gomez-Müller, and trans by 
J.D. Gauthier, S.J., in James Bernauer and David Rasmussen, eds., The Final Foucault (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 
1988), 1-20, quotation from 2-3. Foucault’s insistence that neither ideology nor repression can account for the 
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The event of liberation requires for its continued effectiveness and institutionalization 
a quite specific form of engagement with that society’s characteristic modes for orchestrating 
power and authority. How these flows of power promote or impede the processes of liberation 
depends crucially on how the subject of liberation is constituted, and vice versa, and the 
identification of the subject of liberation with a certain form of the human is one that definitely 
needs to be considered (here using some of Foucault’s formulations as a starting-point). 
While Nietzsche was of course the first to pronounce the ‘death of Man’, a ‘death’ he 
regarded as the obverse and necessary concomitant of the ‘death of God’, Foucault is rightly 
acknowledged as the thinker who more than any other has cast the notion of the ‘death of Man’ 
as a philosopheme of epochal significance. In Les mots et les choses Foucault denounced ‘the 
anthropological sleep’ which ensued when, in the Modern Age prevailing from the early 
nineteenth century onwards, Man was elevated into the governing principle of thought. The 
‘death of Man’, the ending of the anthropological torpor, thus heralds for Foucault the ‘unfolding 
of a space in which it is once more possible to think’.2 The ‘death of Man’ is thus explicitly 
associated by Foucault with the onset of the epistéme taking over from the Modern Age. This 
epistéme, it could be called the post-contemporary epistéme, is one in which beings do not 
approximate to or depart from perfect forms (as they did in the classical epistéme), nor are they 
epistemically recalcitrant (as they were in the modern epistéme, when the discourses of 
knowledge and truth had to be created in order to subdue and overcome this noetic and 
linguistic recalcitrance on the part of the human subject, rendering it knowable and ‘consistent’ 
in spite of this constitutive recalcitrance). Instead, the current epistéme views beings as 
ensembles of forces arranged algorithmically, with no center of consciousness or agency being 
posited as the transcendental fulcrum enabling and justifying moral and noetic activity. The 
‘unlimited finity’ that marks these configurations of forces allows a ‘finite number of 
components [to yield] a practically unlimited diversity of combinations’.3 Recursiveness in the 
mode of an ‘unlimited finite’ is thus ‘emblematically’ the modus operandi of the epoch, our 
epoch, that has succeeded modernity in the eyes of many. 
Foucault had of course a narrative purporting to account for the displacement or 
supersession of modernity along with its pivotal creation, the figure of Man. In Foucault’s 
famous image, Man would be erased in the way that a wave washes away the drawing of a face at 
the edge of the sea. Moreover, as he saw it, of the three components of the anthropological triad 
– life, labor, and language – it would be language that would pave the way for the epistéme that 
                                                             
blocking of this impetus towards freedom is the gist of this passage – for Foucault the primary obstacle to liberation 
arises from the ‘normalization’ of the forms of power that stand in its way, so that, concomitantly, those flows of 
power which run counter to the ruling order are effectively neutralized or diverted to other enterprises where they 
pose no threat to our rulers. 
2 See Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. Alan Sheridan (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1977). According to Foucault, there have been three epistémes or historical formations. In the 
classical epistéme, which came to an end in the European eighteenth century, infinity and perfection were the 
primary forces that shaped human beings. Beings have forms which they instantiate, and it is the task of science to 
provide a cartography of these forms, a systematic cartography whose governing principle is that of the encyclopedia 
or treatise. In the modern epistéme, which reached a point of culmination in the European nineteenth century, 
finitude subtends a space of contiguous domains termed life, labor, and language by Foucault, and here ‘Man’ 
emerges in his own right (as opposed to being a derivation of a perfect being or being itself). In the modern ep 
epistéme we become the subject and object of our own understanding, but this understanding is always provisional 
and incomplete, always confronted by an irreducible epistemic recalcitrance (hence the importance for this epistéme 
of the power-knowledge nexus, so brilliantly analyzed by Foucault). In the current or post-contemporary 
epistéme – whose onset was heralded by Nietzsche, but which is still for Foucault an epistéme of the future – finitude 
(understood typically as empirical constraint), is displaced by a ceaseless flux of forces and their mutations, operating 
primarily at the level of the bios, a flux that Foucault’s interpreter Gilles Deleuze calls an ‘unlimited finity’ 
(fini-illimité). See Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, trans. Sean Hand, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 
131. 
3 See Deleuze, Foucault, 131. 
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superseded modernity and Man.4 Man, Foucault thought, would be undone or overcome by the 
‘enigmatic and precarious being’ of the word, i.e. by language. Here, as Deleuze has argued, 
Foucault got it wrong, or at least he was somewhat off track: as Foucault himself came 
subsequently to acknowledge when he started to identify the notion of biopower, which affirms 
that the practices and forms shaping the new epistéme are arising not so much in the area of 
language, as in those of life and labor.5 Deleuze’s position on the practices of the emerging 
post-contemporary dispensation is clear from the following quotation: 
 
The forces within man enter into a relation with forces from the outside, those of 
silicon which supersedes carbon, or genetic components which supersede the 
organism, or agrammaticialities which supersede the signifier. In each case we must 
study the operations of the superfold, of which the ‘double helix’ is the best known 
example. What is the superman? It is the formal compound of the forces within man 
and these new forces. It is the form that results from a new relation between forces. 
Man tends to free life, labour and language within himself.6 
 
In other words:  there is now an ‘exteriority’ to the human because the human itself 
now interacts in all kinds of novel and historically unprecedented ways with other assemblages 
of forces, ways that entail for Foucault and Deleuze a decisive supersession of the human itself. 
 
The Parahuman 
 It is vital that we be cautious about all such pronouncements about the character of 
epochal shifts and transformations, of the spirit of this or that age, etc., even if they come from 
Foucault or Deleuze or Hegel or whoever – after all, we have just seen that even Foucault lived 
long enough to know that he was not right about the centrality of language and the emergence of 
the post-contemporary epistéme. But let us accept Deleuze’s assumption that the new practices 
that have emerged, and are still emerging, in the domains of life and labor are clearly significant 
for any understanding of these putative post-contemporary knowledges and powers. Equipped 
with this assumption, Deleuze concludes that the onset of the post-contemporary epistéme is to 
be identified with the emergence of a ‘superman’ (though perhaps ‘parahuman’ is the more 
appropriate way of rendering this term). To quote Deleuze: 
 
The superman ... is the man who is even in charge of the animals (a code that can 
capture fragments from other codes, as in the new schemata of lateral or retrograde). 
It is man in charge of the very rocks, or inorganic matter (the domain of silicon). It is 
man in charge of the being of language (that formless, ‘mute, unsignifying region 
where language can find its freedom’ even from whatever it has to say). As Foucault 
would say, the superman is much less than the disappearance of living men, and much 
more than a change of concept: it is the advent of a new form that is neither God nor 
                                                             
4 See Foucault, The Order of Things, 304-5. For Man as a drawing on the sand, see 387. 
5 Paul Rabinow, in commenting on Deleuze’s interpretation of Foucault, has suggested that Foucault 
changed his mind after the publication of The Order of Things, and abandoned his earlier view that the practices of 
the new epistéme were emerging in the domain of language. See Rabinow, ‘Artificiality and Enlightenment:  From 
Sociobiology to Biosociality’, in Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter, eds., Incorporations, (New York: Zone Books, 
1992), 236. I am indebted to Rabinow’s essay for many formulations in this part of the chapter. Foucault had by this 
point started his suggestive reflections on the biopolitical that were to inspire Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri, 
and Agamben (to name a few), and the notion of the ‘post-human’ now has to be grasped through an interpretation of 
the biopolitical for Deleuze and Guattari, if not Hardt and Negri, as well as Agamben. For Foucault on biopower, see 
his ‘The Birth of Biopolitics’, in Foucault, Ethics (Subjectivity and Truth): The Essential Works of Foucault 
1954-1984, Volume 1, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1994), 73-9. 
6 Deleuze, Foucault,132. Italics as in original. 
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man and which, it is hoped, will not prove worse than its two previous forms.7 
 
The end of ‘the anthropological slumber’ that defined the now superseded Modern Age 
therefore offers us the possibility of ‘a new form that is neither God nor man’. The threshold 
from which this new form emerges is associated by Foucault and Deleuze (who basically 
interprets Foucault at this point) with epochal transformations in the domains of labor and life. 
These transformations have an irreducible technological dimension (Heidegger was perhaps the 
first to register the metaphysical implications of this shift), but they are also ontological and 
epistemological at the same time, and collectively they banish any ‘foundational’ appeals to 
teleology, to reason, to natures and essences, to subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Such appeals 
Foucault regarded as the very stuff of the ‘anthropological age’, and the end of this age is for him 
coterminous with the demise of the project of epistemic and metaphysical grounding, the search 
for ‘foundations’ as it is sometimes called, so that the death of Man is necessarily accompanied 
by the death of anthropological metaphysics and the theory of (human, and thus divine) 
judgment. And since the fundamental undertaking for the Modern Age was to find solutions to 
the problems arising from the project of metaphysical and epistemic grounding, the solutions to 
the problems of our age, the post-contemporary epistéme, are not to be found in the problems 
posed for a now bygone age like the Modern Age.8 But what comes after this Modern Age, now 
that the project of this foundational grounding has been forever superseded? 
Metaphysics and epistemology in the traditional sense are defined by the triad that 
constitutes the so-called transcendental field – that is, subject, object, and consciousness – and 
are both effectively terminated by the demise of the age of Man. According to the narrative 
extending from Kant to Husserl and Sartre, a narrative dominated by the imperatives of this 
anthropologism, consciousness, as a transcendental, can manifest itself only when one of its 
counterpart transcendentals, the subject, is able to reflect it by referring it to the third member 
of this triad of transcendentals, namely, the object. Consciousness is thus coextensive with the 
transcendental field, and becomes manifest only when it is revealed by the activity of the subject 
in this relation to the object. As transcendent, the subject and the object are necessarily outside 
the domain of immanence, and the subject as portrayed by this philosophical narrative becomes 
universal subject, just as the object becomes object in general, so that immanence is distorted by 
having always to be posited as a mere reflex or epiphenomenon of the transcendent. Immanence 
ends up being defined and contained by a universal subject that is the a priori basis of the 
synthesis of phenomena, or by an object in general which unites a priori the field of experience. 
Hence the strange paradox of an anthropology, whose raison d’etre would seem on the face of it 
to be immanence and not transcendence, having instead transcendence and not immanence as 
its unavoidable axiomatic presupposition. This anthropology, and the metaphysics and 
epistemology powerfully sustained by it, having broken the back of immanence, are thus in the 
end no more than a form of dedivinized theology, and Foucault and Deleuze therefore effectively 
confirm Nietzsche’s insight that God and Man have each to be discarded with the other.9 The 
                                                             
7 Deleuze, Foucault,132. The embedded quotation is from The Order of Things, 383. 
8 On this aspect of Foucault’s thinking see the illuminating essay by Paul Veyne, ‘The Final Foucault and 
His Ethics’, trans. Catherine Porter and Arnold I. Davidson, in Davidson, ed., Foucault and his Interlocutors 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 225-33. To quote Veyne: 
 
The course of history does not include eternal problems, problems of essences or of dialectics; it only 
offers valorizations that differ from one culture to another and even from one individual to another, 
valorizations that, as Foucault was fond of saying, are neither true nor false: they are, that’s all, and each 
individual is the patriot of his or her own values. (226) 
 
9 The position on transcendence and immanence formulated in this paragraph replicates Deleuze’s account 
in ‘Immanence: A Life’, in his collection Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life, trans. Anne Boyman (New York: MIT 
Press, 2001), 25-33. 
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reinstatement of the field of immanence, so that transcendence now becomes a function of it 
(and not vice-versa), will therefore necessitate the abandonment of anthropology. When this 
move is made, the transcendental field still exists, but it can only be grasped in and through 
immanence, and not subject, object, and consciousness constituted as the age-old 
transcendentals. There is, as was noted in the previous chapter, a distinction, at once important 
and impossible to overlook, between transcendence and the transcendent, and it could be 
suggested by our critics that subject, object, and consciousness only require a transcendence 
(which is compatible with an ontological immanence) and not the transcendent (which is 
obviously incompatible with the immanent). The appropriate response to this suggestion, 
however, is that the notions subject, object, and consciousness are themselves secularized 
versions of concepts that were initially based on the metaphysical domain of the transcendent. 
The subjectum of modern epistemology and ethics is an essential derivative of the medieval 
subjectus (as Etienne Balibar and others have pointed out), and the fundamental impetus of any 
thinking after the epoch of modernity has been to show that these particular notions are 
irremovably connected to the transcendent, and as such do not have the kind of basic 
commensurability with the immanent that a rigorous immanentism imposes on its defining 
metaphysical principles. If this line of argument is accepted, the question arises whether there 
are any forms of thought and practice not connected in regard to their origination with the 
transcendent (as subject, object, and consciousness are)? What, in other words, would it be to 
view the metaphysical or ontological constitution of cultural and social formations in terms of 
the field of pure immanence, as opposed to that of an anthropology predicated on the 
above-mentioned triad of transcendents? 
As has been noted, the ontological constitution of social and cultural formations is 
typically delineated in terms of either the universal subject and its concomitant intersubjectivity 
(e.g. Rousseau’s account of the general will, Habermas’s ideal speech communities, and so on) 
or the general object (e.g. sensation or emotions or the passions and the pleasantness or 
unpleasantness thereof, as in Hume and Bentham, and that which confers utility, as in the 
empiricist or utilitarian traditions – but then this sensation, etc., is only an abstraction, 
necessarily arbitrary, of the flow of absolute consciousness, as Bergson and Deleuze point out). 
That is, this ontological constitution of the social and the cultural, even when one is talking of 
such basic phenomena as ‘sensation’ or ‘sense data’, is already imbued with the remnants of the 
transcendent in the problematic sense just outlined.10 
It is also the case that social and cultural formations owe their existence and functions 
to what Deleuze calls accords or ‘concerts’.11 These accords are act-principles which provide 
conditions of possibility for the conjugation of all manner of events, personages, processes, 
movements, institutions, and so forth, in this way making it possible for the resultant 
assemblage or configuration to become an integrated formation. Capitalism is a good example of 
precisely such an accord, or rather, as an axiomatics (to use again the terminology of Deleuze 
and Guattari) it is more like an accord of accords, a ‘meta-accord’, which links, for instance, the 
accord governing the relationship in South Africa that exists between labor (black gold-miners), 
capitalists (the corporations owning the mines), and a commodity (the raw gold deposits 
extracted by the black miners) with the accord that governs a relationship in Switzerland 
between another labor-force (workers in a Swiss watch factory), other capitalists (the owners of 
the watch factory), and a commodity (an expensive gold watch), which in turn is linked with 
another accord governing a relationship in London or Atlanta between that commodity (the 
                                                             
10 Deleuze is of course the noted proponent of a ‘transcendental empiricism’, that is, he accounts for the 
transcendental field not in terms of notions of subject and self, but, in a way that is indebted to Bergson, as ‘a pure 
immediate consciousness with neither object nor self, as movement that neither begins nor ends…’.  See 
‘Immanence: A Life’, 26. 
11 See Deleuze, The Fold, 130ff. 
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Swiss gold watch), still other capitalists (the owners of the British or American jewelry store 
selling the watch), and consumers (the buyers of the expensive Swiss watches). The apparently 
disparate zones of accumulation and production represented by the gold mine just outside 
Johannesburg, the watch factory in Zürich, and the jewelry store in London or Atlanta are 
rendered ‘harmonious’ by the higher-level accord or ‘concert’ created by capital, even though the 
lower-level accords which govern the regimes of accumulation prevailing at each of these zones 
remain (qua lower-level accords) disconnected from each other. Each lower-level accord retains 
its relative autonomy, and requires the meta-accord established by capital to bring it into 
concert with the other accords to which it is connected. The ‘concerto grosso’ orchestrated by the 
meta-accord enables the lower-level accords to function independently of each other while still 
expressing the same world, the world of the current system of accumulation and production. 
This meta-accord allows capital to operate as a system of vastly ramified but still interconnected 
functions, linking peoples, places, infrastructures and transportation systems, technologies, raw 
materials and finished products, corporations, governments, and so on. Capital, as Deleuze and 
Guattari, Fredric Jameson, and Slavoj ?i?ek have rightly suggested, is the only (false) universal 
left. 
 
Accords and Immanence 
Accords, as was pointed out above, are set-up by implementing selection criteria, i.e. 
inclusion or exclusion criteria, for the accord in question. These criteria also determine with 
which other possible or actual accords a particular accord will be compatible (or incompatible) 
with. What seems to be occurring today, with the problematization or breakdown of the 
previously regnant ways of organizing the transcendental field (the now well-known several 
crises of the universal subject, the breakdown of the general object and its supersession by 
newer categories (‘flows’, ‘forces’, ‘spectacles’, etc.) which make possible radically new 
combinatorial systems involving myriad concatenations of part-objects), is that such selection 
criteria, which may or may not be explicitly formulated, are weakening or disappearing 
altogether. The selection criteria assign privileges of rank and order between disparate entities, 
assemblages of entities, relative speeds of movement, and spatial configurations. Their loss or 
attenuation make dissonances and contradictions difficult to resolve, and, conversely, 
divergences become easier to affirm. Without any really viable ‘transcendental’ accords to 
discipline them conceptually or narratively, events, objects (both whole and part), and 
personages can now be assigned simultaneously to several divergent and even incompossible 
series. Thus, for example, Lautréamont’s somewhat derisive definition of reality (‘the chance 
encounter between a sewing-machine and an umbrella on a dissecting table’), a definition that 
would have prompted some bewilderment on the part of a Kant or John Dewey, is now virtually 
a commonplace after all the culturally sanctioned opportunities many of us have had to 
negotiate the several artistic avant-gardes, novelists like Borges and Georges Perec, cyberpunk, 
the new generation of video games, various atonal and fusion musical genres, the architectures 
of Gehry and Eisenman, and so on. The ontologies associated with the writings of Deleuze, 
Baudrillard, Virilio, et alia, are designed precisely to give conceptual expression to the aleatory, 
the haphazard, and the unanticipated, that is, they permit definitions of ‘reality’ in ways 
fundamentally accordant with the spirit of Lautréamont’s seemingly bizarre characterization of 
it.  
These ‘chaotic’ accords or quasi-accords, all eschewing the transcendent, are now 
well-positioned in our culture, and they have precipitated the collapse of a number of once 
deeply entrenched distinctions serving as the basis for this culture’s self-understanding: the 
demarcations between public and private, inside and outside, before and after, and so on, have 
all become difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. In the process, however, accords thus severed 
from any conditions capable of guaranteeing their stability (the primary function of the 
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transcendental field) likewise become ‘impossible’. We may be living in worlds, or reading texts 
and listening to scripts, no longer predicated on any need to secure and sustain accords – these 
are radically immanent worlds characterized by sheer variation and multiplicity; worlds in 
which new powers of figuration are emerging, and which partake of a neo-Baroque more ‘truly’ 
Baroque than its predecessor.12 This is the world in which allegory comes into its own, having 
supplanted narrative as the primary instrument for the transcoding that according to Fredric 
Jameson is the necessary prolepsis for any theoretical and practical grasp of its otherwise 
effaced emancipatory possibilities and potentialities. Or put in terms of the argument advanced 
in this chapter, with the ‘systemic’ loss of accords sustained by an intrinsic relation to a 
transcendental field, those belonging to this culture now experience the world, their communal 
affiliations, etc., in terms that are shot through with allegory. Our very criteria of belonging to 
this culture are inextricably wedded to such allegorizing propensities. In which case, to say ‘I 
belong’ is to say and do something that is necessarily emblematic and evocative of something 
else, something very different from what would be the case if there were some kind of necessity 
or requirement that shielded my (or your) ‘belonging’ from the pressures of an inescapable 
allegorization or metaphoricity. 
When, for instance, the right-wing American evangelical leader Jerry Falwell 
identified one of the ‘teletubbies’ as ‘gay’ he was at one level being the unreconstructed 
queer-basher he has been for a long time. But at another level, something else was happening:  
by making ‘queerness’ the property of a transhuman or parahuman being like a ‘teletubby’, 
Falwell was, in spite of himself, making or tacitly acknowledging a point with some pretty 
interesting implications for someone invested in the project of a ‘gay liberation’. If ‘being queer’ 
is a property that can be transposed into a domain that is trans- or parahuman like that of the 
telletubbies,  then it is possible that ‘queerness’ is everywhere (and quite literally so);  in 
which case it quite literally spills across barriers between species (real and imaginary), and is 
therefore actually and potentially unbounded and uncontainable. Of course it is exactly this 
scenario of an undelimitable ‘queerness’ which evokes in Falwell and his supporters so much 
anxiety and anger.   But the possibility of an unbounded and uncontainable ‘queerness’ – 
Falwell’s great but for him dreaded discovery, if it could be put this way – is precisely the 
expression of a utopian-heterotopian possibility for someone who is queer. If ‘being queer’ is a 
property that can be distributed in at least two divergent series – ‘human’ on the one hand, 
‘teletubby’ on the other – then who knows what or who else can be queer, perhaps the cherubim 
and seraphim in heaven, or maybe for some even Jesus himself.... Placing the property ‘being 
queer’ in two divergent series therefore enables proponents of the project of a gay liberation to 
become the unintended addressees of a subversive subtext lodged in Falwell’s otherwise risible 
pronouncements on the erotic dispositions of the teletubbies. Shorn of the reference to 
American popular culture, the example of Falwell and the telletubbies illustrates the point being 
made by Foucault in his readings of ancient Greek sexuality and by Deleuze and Guattari in their 
Reichian-inflected reading of Freud’s notion of a polymorphous perversity.13 
In this epoch of the demise of the transcendental field buttressed by the 
metaphysico-anthropological framework criticized by Foucault and Deleuze, the matter of 
conceiving (let alone assigning or determining) identities becomes inherently problematic. For 
conceiving of identities is an undertaking that hinges crucially on the retention of the concept 
(as opposed to the description, which can be more easily propelled into this or that divergent 
series). The specification of an identity requires that the identity in question be determinate with 
                                                             
12 This of course is the tenor of Deleuze’s argument in The Fold. 
13 For Foucault’s reclaiming of the Greek precept that the object or goal of what we today call the sexual 
relationship is pleasure with the other regardless of the biological sex of that other, see his ‘The Ethic of Care for the 
Self as a Practice of Freedom’, 1-9. For Deleuze and Guattari’s Reichian conception of polymorphous perversity, see 
Anti-Oedipus, 118-19. 
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regard to a concept or amalgam of concepts (‘being American’, ‘being a communist’, ‘being an 
academic’, or whatever), a concept whose range of applicability is regulated by certain criteria of 
belonging. And if such criteria have no (‘transcendental’) accords to motivate and underpin 
them, then identities can always be read emblematically and inscriptively, that is, allegorically. 
So where does this leave us? 
It may be that we would better off if we discarded the notion of an identity in favor of 
another quite different notion, namely, that of a singularity. Intrinsic to the notion of a 
singularity is the principle that a common or shared property cannot serve as the basis of the 
individuation of X or Y from all that is not-X or not-Y: if I share the property of being over six 
feet tall with someone else, then that property cannot, in and of itself, serve to individuate either 
me or that person from each other. A singularity, the being-X of X that makes X different from 
all that is not-X, cannot therefore unite X with anything else. Precisely the opposite: X is a 
singularity because it is not united with anything else by virtue of an essence or a common or 
shared nature. A singularity is a thing with all its properties, and although some commonality 
may still pertain to this thing, that commonality is indifferent to it qua singularity. So, of course, 
Thomas Jefferson will have the property ‘being American’ in common with other people, many 
millions of them in fact. But a singularity is determined only through its relation to the totality 
of its possibilities, and it is the totality of possibilities named ‘Thomas Jefferson’ that constitutes 
Thomas Jefferson as an absolute singularity – if another being had each and every one of the 
possibilities whose totality constituted and thus individuated Jefferson, then he would perforce 
be indistinguishable from Jefferson. He would be the same being or person. 
An epoch in which ‘transcendental’ accords do not give us our worlds or our texts is 
one in which our criteria of belonging will always be subject to a kind of chaotic motion. The 
notion of an identity, no matter how much one acknowledges that identities in principle shift or 
fragment or are subject in their constitution to a whole range of irreducible contingencies, 
involves an unavoidable denial of this knowledge: for an identity, as Hegel saw, is always to be 
specified by recourse to the dialectic of identity and difference, in other words, it requires the 
principle of dialectical negation for its operation, so that when I say ‘I am British’ this carries 
with it the entailment that I am not French and not American and not Nigerian, and so forth. A 
core of essentialism therefore resides in the very notion of an identity: if one is an X, then one is 
an X if and only if there is a determinate sense in which that what one is, is precisely a negation 
of all that is not-X (at any rate this has to be the case as long as one remains an X).  Identities 
are never independent of the subjectivity and the objectivity of ‘what is the case’, and so they 
always refer back to a transcendental field that is not, and indeed never can be, constituted in 
terms of immanence. 
It is a truism, albeit one that is scarcely acknowledged and done justice to, that before 
one can be a subject one has to have a life.14 A life which resides in all the moments that a 
subject is immersed in and which lived objects order and move around, moments (moments are 
events and singularities) which actualize themselves in subjects and objects and which become 
the states of living things. The subject, according to this account, is the ‘point of view’ taken on 
these moments, it is the singularity which consists of the conjoined perspectives on the 
singularities that make up its life. Here is Deleuze’s fundamental statement on this 
characterization of the subject as a concatenation of ‘affects, intensities, experiences, 
experiments’: 
 
... it doesn’t at all come with seeing yourself as an ego or a person or a subject. 
Individuals only find a real name for themselves in the harshest exercise in 
depersonalization, by opening themselves up to the multiplicities everywhere within 
                                                             
14 In what follows I adhere closely to the line of thought developed by Deleuze in ‘Immanence’, 5. 
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them, to the intensities running through them.... One becomes a set of liberated 
singularities, words, names, fingernails, things, animals, little events: quite the 
reverse of a celebrity.15  
 
The subject posited by metaphysico-anthropology is thus too abstract to be the subject 
of a life:  instead of being the assembled point of view on the myriad singularities that make up 
a life, it is the a priori, and thus necessarily abstract and abstracted, condition for the perceiving, 
experiencing, etc., of these singularities. The upshot is that the singularities are voided of life 
and vitality, inasmuch as they become mere functions of the subjectivity that registers them, 
rather than requiring the subject to be given its proper place, i.e. as that which exists fleetingly 
and concretely between these moments, between these singularities. The universal subject, to 
put it succinctly, is simply inadequate to the manifold vagaries, the mish-mash of practices and 
experiences that make up life.  
The ending of modernity’s ‘anthropological slumber’ therefore coincides with the time 
in which it becomes possible to acknowledge that there is no truth of history or philosophy 
except the one which declares that there is no longer an essential nature or transcendent reason 
to be invoked as the raison d’etre for our struggles for a better world. Modern truth and reason 
and Man are now dead (Man being understood as a conceptual figure, not a biological being), 
say Nietzsche, Foucault, and Deleuze, just as classical truth and reason had to make way for 
their modern successors.16 It will perhaps now be possible to take as the launching-point for our 
struggles Foucault’s haunting question – ‘d’où vient que la vérité soit si peu vraie?’. ‘Why is 
there so little truth in truth?’ Meaning not that there is no such thing as the will to truth, but that 
this will to truth is always the resultant of a certain activation of the will to power, and that the 
former has force only insofar as the latter gives it whatever force it has come to possess. But 
what would such a will to power be for those who are involved in the quest for liberation? The 
subject of the ethics and epistemology of the previous epoch was necessarily abstracted from the 
situations in which the will to power exercised itself – the being of this transcendental subject 
had to be posited in advance of any disposition of power, since the subject was precisely the 
pivot from which the will was deployed. 17 To provide a critique of this 
metaphysico-anthropological subject is relatively easy (the gist of this critique being standard 
fare for any of the structuralisms and poststructuralisms, as well as psychoanalytic theory); the 
crucial question is what, if anything, we put in its place. 
 
Part Objects and Desubjectivation 
Even if the so-called unitary experiencing subject and the unitary general object of 
experience are dispensed with, the realities of the condition called ‘experiencing’ and the 
standpoints of the one who undertakes this ‘experiencing’ remain as brute and as yet unanalyzed 
phenomena, and thus have still to be reckoned with conceptually by the theorist of liberation. If 
we accept the basic assumption of psychoanalytic theory that experience is governed by a 
structure put in place by one’s very early identifications with the various elements (or 
singularities) of an internal and an external reality, then experience has to be seen as the 
resultant of the functioning of this structure and the array of identifications that lies at its heart. 
In their account of the nature and scope of these identifications, conducted by them as part of 
their explication of their fundamental notion ‘desire’, Deleuze and Guattari, to whose account of 
the beyond-human we have so far been indebted, were impressed by the work of the British 
                                                             
15 See Deleuze, ‘Letter to a Harsh Critic’, in his Negotiations, 6-7. 
16  On this question, see Veyne, ‘The Final Foucault’, 231. 
17 As Deleuze points out, to understand the deployment of the will in this way (‘before I can will, I have to be 
constituted in my transcendental being’) is precisely to misunderstand Nietzsche. On this see Deleuze, Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, 6ff and 49ff. 
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‘object relations’ school of psychoanalysis, and in particular the writings of D.W. Winnicott and 
W.R. Bion.18  
Object relations theory in the versions of Winnicott and Bion takes our primary 
identifications to be formed not by direct psychic linkages to anatomical features (and their 
surrogates), no matter how fantasized, such as the breast of the mother, genitalia, and so forth, 
but rather by identifications with the plethora of functions associated with these and a whole 
range of other objects. Thus, in the object relations description of our identifications, it is 
emphasized that identifications are not with some object per se (the mother’s breast being the 
object favored by a more traditional psychoanalysis), but rather with the several functions 
served by the object in question (such as giving, loving, hating, fearing (as in the anxiety that the 
beloved object is somehow poisonous to the one assimilating it), punishing, and so forth). 
Deleuze and Guattari generalize this insight in their account of desire, and maintain that this 
decisive shift on the part of the object relations school makes identification a more visibly 
political undertaking. After all, giving, loving, hating, fearing, punishing, and so forth, are more 
overtly political in their orientation than anything conveyed, say, by the mere expression 
‘identification involving the breast of the mother’. If there is an overarching injunction in 
Deleuze and Guattari, it is not so much the one that politics needs to attend to objects, as the 
one that what is crucially determinative here is rather the set of functions undertaken by the 
objects in question. An object in itself means nothing unless we are able to ascertain whether it 
invokes in us the specific responses of love, hate, fear, anxiety, indifference, sadness, joy, and so 
on. The question ‘What is X?’ is answerable only if the questions ‘how’ and ‘why’ with regard to 
X are posed and answered, since the nature of X is linked, inextricably, to its functionality (i.e. 
the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions). This ‘object relations’ psychoanalytic insight resonates with the 
philosophical positions of Spinoza and Nietzsche, for whom a being is always an amalgam of the 
forces that it receives and transmits, and the ensuing states which it then happens to be in.19 
Once this principle is accepted, the theory that derives from it can only be a theory of 
desubjectivation, that is, it will be a theory that discounts from the beginning the notion of a 
sovereign subject able to legislate for the constitution of consciousness and the judgments 
delivered by that consciousness. But what does desubjectivation actually involve? 
At the heart of the notion of desubjectivation is the claim that the relation between 
consciousness and object is not mediated by the sovereign subject or ego, but that, rather, the 
flux of experience itself affects in very significant ways the constitution of the ego or subject. So 
what is the subject? The ego or subject, from the object relations standpoint glossed here, is 
instead more plausibly to be viewed as a viewpoint, or series of viewpoints, on this flux, in a way 
or ways that allow the flux itself to affect directly the nature of the viewpoints that are in the 
process of being constituted even as they respond reciprocally to the contents of this flux. The 
subject as seen here the outcome of a certain constellation of the ego or self with the always 
variable objects to which the subject is related. If there is no essential or eternal structure to the 
                                                             
18 See Deleuze, ‘Nomad Thought’, in his Desert Islands and Other Texts, 252-61; and Anti-Oedipus, 19, note, 
where reference is made to Bion’s Elements of Psycho-analysis (London: Heinemann, 1963). For commentary see Jay 
R. Greenberg and Stephen A. Mitchell, Object Relations in PsychoanalyticTheory (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1983). Greenberg and Mitchell do not however discuss Bion. For discussion of Bion, see the 
intellectual biography by Gérard Bléandonu, Wilfred Bion: His Life and Works 1897-1979, trans. Claire Pajaczkowska 
(New York: Guilford Press, 1994). 
19 Perhaps an excellent illustration of this point is Bion’s suggestion that the difference between courage 
(running towards the enemy) and cowardice (running away from the enemy) in war was often simply the direction in 
which you ran. Bion was a much decorated veteran of the First World War, and his point, certainly made somewhat 
tongue in cheek, indicates that the virtue ‘courage’ and the vice ‘cowardice’ are tied to physical dispositions (‘running’ 
in this case) whose meaning can only be determined if the functions (moving away from or moving towards a 
perceived enemy) and context (in this case a battle) of these dispositions are taken into account. For this reference to 
Bion’s remark, see Adam Phillips, ‘Malingering: Review of Peter Barham, Forgotten Lunatics of the Great War‘, 
London Review of Books 27:5 (2005), 20-1. 
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subject, then the viewpoint, no matter how solidified or fluid, taken on the flow of experience 
can be established in a variety of ways not governed by any kind of absolute and overarching 
normativity. This being so, the perspectival-subject can have defining affinities with a whole 
range of beings, including non-human animals and divine beings, and of course those 
animal-beings designated as ‘human’. Or it could occupy a position in which the predicates 
typically identified as ‘human’ and ‘divine’ cease to be operative (the philosophical scenario 
envisaged by Deleuze). It is not necessary at this stage to endorse the position taken by Deleuze. 
Suffice it to say, though, that the kind of being permitted by this understanding of the 
‘parahuman’ is compatible with Deleuze’s position, even if it is not entailed or required by it. It 
will all depend on what the ‘human’ and the ‘divine’ enable us to achieve. If they have failed, and 
Deleuze is convinced they have failed, then by all means let us find more enabling alternatives.    
We in the west have no clear sense of what these alternatives might be. But outside the west, 
conceptions of liberation not necessarily tied to the ‘human’ and the ‘divine’ have long existed. It 
is not obvious that they are any more inferior to those that have prevailed in the cultures of the 
west. At the same time, of course, it is not evident that conceptions that bypass the ‘human’ and 
the ‘divine’ are intrinsically human. But now may be the time to give them a try. 
